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BEYOND CYBERNETIC FEDERALISM IN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT*
RICHARD DELEON**
RICHARD LEGATES***
Fourteen and one-half billion dollars in federal Community De-
velopment Block Grant (CDBG) assistance has been authorized for
expenditure in the next three years by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1977 (hereinafter 1977 Act).' Most of this money
will be distributed by means of computer formulas that compress all
considerations regarding which jurisdictions should get the assistance
into less than half a page of algebraic symbols.2
* This research was assisted by a faculty development grant from San Francisco
State University. Special thanks are due to Paul Dommel and Harold Bunce who
offered valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. We gratefully acknowl-
edge the assistance of Phyllis DeLeon and Norma Montgomery in preparation of this
article.
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Urban Studies Pro-
gram, San Francisco State University. Ph.D, Washington University, 1972.
*** Director, Urban Studies Program, Associate Professor, Urban Studies Pro-
gram and Department of Political Science, San Francisco State University; Member,
California Bar. B.A., Harvard University, 1965; J.D., University of California (Boalt
Hall) School of Law, 1968; M.C.P., University of California, Berkeley, 1969.
1. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91
Stat. I 11 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 40, 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1978)). For a summary, see LeGates, 1977 Act Changes CDBG Program, 29 LAND
USE LAW AND ZONING DIG. 5 (1977).
2. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5306
(West Supp. 1978).
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Quantified norms and programmable decision rules provide for an
automatic, machine-like federal response to local problems and
needs, like "the cybernetic state" as described by Alan Schick:
Government writes the program (in the computer sense of the
word), establishes sociostatic norms (such as the "poverty
level"), monitors the system and activates the money-disbursing
machines.3
"Cybernetic federalism" is the order of the day. But can the enor-
mously diverse and politically fluid American federal system be un-
derstood and dealt with in this way ? How much federal assistance to
allocate to a local jurisdiction for community development activities
might be more preferably based on analysis of such diverse economic
factors as changing city tax bases and shifting locations of economic
activity, demographic considerations such as white flight and differ-
ential fertility ratios of child bearing women, and political considera-
tions including the existence or non-existence of political machines,
political corruption, and political ideologies favorable or unfavorable
to publicly-assisted development. None of these factors is addressed
directly in the CDBG formula.
The attempt to impose cybernetic rationality upon any complex
and politically charged system is a perilous enterprise, and the
CDBG program is no exception. The original CDBG distribution
formula was criticized by the authors and others for badly mistarget-
ing aid.4 Pressures for formula change mounted, as did pressures for
more discretion in CDBG grant authority, from sources critical of
formula-based dispersal of CDBG funds. During debate over the
1977 Act, Senate and House conferees deadlocked for several months
over both formula (impaction adjustment) and discretionary grant
(UDAG) issues.' Eventually a new "dual formula" and additional
discretionary "Urban Development Action Grants" (UDAG's) were
included in the legislation.6 The nature of both the CDBG formula
and discretionary CDBG grants will surely continue to occupy the
attention of federal policy makers.
This Article will analyze the recent history and current status of the
CDBG funding distribution system. In significant part, the Article is
3. Schick, The Cybernetic State, 7 TRANSAcrIoN 14, 18 (1970).
4. See notes 8 and 31-35 infra.
5. See Stanfield, Civil War Over Cities' Aid-he Battle No One Expected, 9
NAT'L J. 1226 (1977).
6. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 106, 42 U.S.C.A. §
5306 (West Supp. 1978) (dual formula); Id § 5318 (UDAG).
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intended to inform attorneys and other urban practitioners of the cur-
rent status of CDBG formula and related allocation mechanisms. A
critique of the current formula and recommendations for reform are
advanced, but the Article also seeks to address broader issues con-
cerning the strengths and limitations of computer formulas as devices
for distributing intergovernmental assistance. We seek to postulate
basic principles for a mixed formula and discretionary grant system
beyond "cybernetic federalism."
This Article addresses the following major questions:
1. What shifts in the distribution of federal funds does the new
CDBG dual formula produce? Does the new formula redirect urban
aid to regions of the country and to cities whose needs were neglected
or inadequately met by the old formula?
2. To what extent, and by what criteria, is the new CDBG dual
formula more efficient than the old formula in distributing CDBG
assistance in relation to need in American cities? Are "vertical effi-
ciency" (reaching only needy jurisdictions) and "horizontal effi-
ciency" (reaching all needy jurisdictions) achieved?
3. What are the socioeconomic characteristics of cities protected
against loss by retention of the original CDBG formula? Is this pro-
tection against loss desirable on grounds other than political expedi-
ency?
4. To the extent that deficiencies in the new formula appear from
the above analysis, what approaches to formula redesign might prove
most productive? What are the possibilities and limitations of differ-
ent "impaction adjustment alternatives"? Should immediate or
delayed capping or cutting take place with respect to some city allo-
cations?
5. Beyond changes in the CDBG allocation formula, what correc-
tive changes can be made in the federal system for allocating and
regulating assistance? What role can administrative discretion, citizen
participation, and advocacy play in a semi-cybernated distribution
system?
6. What are the lessons to be drawn from recent CDBG experi-
ence in trying to cybernate the federal system? How can an appropri-
ate balance be struck between computer systems and structured
human decisionmaking in complex and politically sensitive areas of
public policy?
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BACKGROUND
The 1977 Act extends and modifies the system of block grants for
community development begun by the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 1974 (hereinafter 1974 Act).7 The CDBG program
has been extensively evaluated,' and the subject of substantial schol-
arly attention.9 There has been a substantial amount of litigation con-
7. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91
Stat. 1111 (1977) (codified in scattered titles of 12, 40, 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1978)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. V 1975)).
8. P. DOMMEL, R. NATHAN, S. LIEBSCHITZ, M. WRIGHTSON, ET. AL., DECEN-
TRALIZING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1978); D. MARSHALL & R. WASTE, IMPLE-
MENTING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN TEN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA CITIES
(1977); R. NATHAN, P. DOMMEL, S. LIEBSCHITZ & M. MORRIS, BLOCK GRANTS FOR
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTr (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLOCK GRANTS]; R.
THORNESON AND THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PLANNERS ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE IN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, BUREAUCRATIC RED TAPE IN COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT: A NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND PERSPECTIVE (1977); U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: THE WORKINGS
OF A FEDERAL-LOCAL BLOCK GRANT (1977); E. BLATIELY & M. ZONE, SMALL CITIES
AND THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974 (1976); R. DELEON & R. LEG-
ATES, REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REVENUE SHARING FOR COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT (1976) [hereinafter cited as REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS]; M. MORRIS,
NEW FEDERALISM AND THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974 (1976); NA-
TIONAL AsS'N OF HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, YEAR ONE FINDINGS:
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANTS (1976); NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PRO-
JECT, REPORT TO FORD FOUNDATION: EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM IN SELECTED CALIFORNIA CITIES (1976); SOUTHERN
REGIONAL COUNCIL, A TIME FOR ACCOUNTING: THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACT IN THE SOUTH (1976) [hereinafter cited as SOUTHERN REGIONAL
COUNCIL]; U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEETING APPLI-
CATION AND REVIEW REQUIREMENTS FOR BLOCK GRANTS UNDER TITLE I OF THE
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974 (1976); U.S. CQMPTROLLER
GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WHY THE FORMULA FOR ALLOCATING COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT FUNDS SHOULD BE IMPROVED (1976); U.S.
DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD), OFFICE OF POLICY DEVEL-
OPMENT AND EVALUATION, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNITY BLOCK GRANT
FORMULA (1976) [hereinafter cited as EVALUATION OF CBDG FORMULA]; U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD), OFFICE OF EVALUATION, COMMU-
NITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT
PROGRAM: SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1976); Witte, Community Development'r Third
Year, 35 J. HOUSING 66 (1978); DeLeon & LeGates, Community Development Block
Grants: Redistribution Effects and Equity Issue4 9 URB. LAW. 363 (1977).
9. D. FRIEDMAN & M. KAPLAN, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE MODEL
CITIES LEGACY (1976); Stanfield, Administration Seeking New Grant Formula, 9
NAT'L J. 237 (1977); Landieth, Four Elements-Planning, Citizen Partic4,ation, Hous-
ing Assistance and A-95 Review Under Title I of the Community Development Act of
1974, 9 URB. LAW. 61 (1977); Bach, The New Federalism in Community Development,
7 Soc. POL'Y. 32 (1977); Kushner, Litigation Strategies and Judicial Review Under
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 37
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cerning CDBG issues."°
Prior to 1974, federal community development aid had been dis-
tributed in the form of "categorical grant" assistance for projects
which fell into one of ten specified "categories" for assistance."
These categorical grants were distributed solely at the discretion of
HUD.
12
The 1974 Act folded these ten categorical programs into a single
(1976); Kushner, Community Planning and Development Under the Housing and Com-
munit; Development Act of 1974 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 661 (1975); Hirsher &
LeGates, HUD's Bonanzafor Suburbia, 30 THE PROGRESSIVE 32 (1975); Fishman,
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act, 7 URB. LAW. 89 (1975); Note,
HUD's NEP.A. Responsibilities Under the Housing and Community Development Act
of 197f Delegation or Derogation?, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 179 (1975).
10. For a summary of the cases, see Keating & LeGates, Community Develop-
ment Block Grant Litigation, Appendix to P. DOMMEL, R. NATHAN, S. LIEBSCHITZ,
M. WRIGHTSON, ET. AL., DECENTRALIZING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, SECOND
REPORT (1978). CDBG cases filed as of September, 1977 include: Broader v. Harris,
No. 77-899 (W.D. Pa., filed August 23, 1977) (pending); League of Women Voters of
v. Hams, No. 76-521 (W.D. Wash., filed July 27, 1977) (dismissed); Bradley v. HUD,
No. 77-2144 (S.D. Va., filed July 8, 1977) (pending); Davis v. Pomorg, No. 77-839
(C.D. Cal., filed June 30, 1977) (dismissed without prejudice on settlement); Bois
D'Arc Patriots v. Dallas, No. 3-76-1504 (N.D. Texas, fied June 24, 1977) (dismissed);
Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Rizzo, No. 76-1767 (E.D. Pa., filed May 19, 1977)
(settled--consent order); HANC v. Mascone, No. 77-0817 (N.D. Cal., filed April 21,
1977) (pending); Garcia v. Hills, No. 76-1014 (C.D. Cal., filed April 15, 1977) (dis-
missed); Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD, No. 77-0503 (E.D. Mich.,
filed March 2, 1977) (pending); Central & Western Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Hills,
No. 76-67 (S.D. Iowa, filed January 24, 1977) (settled--consent order); Hodder v.
Hills, No. 76-3867 (S.D.N.Y., filed January 7, 1977); NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp.
102 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (dismissed without prejudice); Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org.
v. Embry, 438 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Edison Branch, NAACP v. Hills, No. 75-
1461 (C.D.N.J., filed January 18, 1976) (settled--consent order); Johnson v. Chester,
413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Tes-
terman, 404 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Ulster County Community Action
Comm. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11. Major categorical grants consolidated into the Block Grant Program include:
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (Supp. V 1975) (Urban
Renewal); Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374 (Supp. V 1975) (Model Cities); Federally Assisted Housing Code
Enforcement, 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (1970); Neighborhood Development Program, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1469-1469c (1970); Emergency Community Facilities Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 3102 (1970); Public Works or Facilities Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1497
(1970).
12. A distinction is drawn between "formula" grants in which designated recipi-
ent jurisdictions are entitled to a certain amount of aid on the basis of formula, and
discretionary "project" grants in which eligible jurisdictions must apply for aid.
Prior to 1974, federal community development programs were "project" grant pro-
grams.
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"block" grant.1 3 Since that time HUD has allocated to cities and ur-
ban counties a single amount of money each year for use in virtually
any physical development activity anywhere in the community.' 4
Under the CDBG legislation, most assistance is distributed by
formula(s) as a matter of entitlement. All "metropolitan cities"-any
city designated as the central city of an SMSA or having over 50,000
population-is eligible for an automatic entitlement amount as deter-
mined by formula(s). 15 "Urban counties" which meet specified legal
and population size criteria are also eligible for entitlement funding
by formula.16
Under the 1974 legislation, as modified in 1977, several classes of
CDBG discretionary grants may be made.'7 Three percent of annual
appropriations are reserved for the HUD Secretary's discretionary
fund.' 8 Twenty percent of the remainder is set aside for discretionary
grants to nonmetropolitan cities.' 9 Of the eighty percent allocated to
cities and urban counties within metropolitan areas, a small amount
is set aside for metropolitan discretionary grants to communities
within metropolitan areas not eligible as a matter of entitlement and
not participating in an urban county grant.2 0 The precise amount of
this metropolitan discretionary fund depends upon the number of
qualifying urban counties. Between 1975 and 1977 it was virtually
non-existent.21
13. For a discussion of the background and significance of the changes, see R.
NATHAN, P. DOMMEL, S. LIEBSCHITZ & M. MORRIS, BLOCK GRANTS FOR COMMU-
NITY DEVELOPMENT 31-56 (1977).
14. Eligible activities are specified at 42 U.S.C. § 5305 (Supp. V 1975), including a
full gamut of physical development undertakings. Unlike many prior categorical pro-
grams, the 1974 Act did not contain provisions restricting the activities to any type
project area(s) within the city.
15. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 106,42 U.S.C.A. § 5306
(West Supp. 1978).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 5307 (Secretary's discretionary fund); Id. § 5306 (Metropolitan and
Non-Metropolitan discretionary balances); Id. § 5318 (Urban Development Action
Grants).
18. Id. § 5307.
19. Id. § 5306(f).
20. Id. § 5306(c).
21. The following amounts were allocated to CDBG Metropolitan discretionary
funding: $54.6 million (Fiscal Year 1975), $82 million (Fiscal Year 1976) and $100
million (Fiscal Year 1977 estimate). U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT (HUD), OFFICE OF EVALUATION, COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT,
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM: SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
(1976).
[Vol. 15:17
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Until 1980 funds will be phased in or out to mitigate program dis-
continuities. But starting in 1980 funding for entitlement jurisdic-
tions-the greatest amount-will be entirely cybernetically
determined on the basis of formulas alone.22
Recipient jurisdictions are required to submit tri-annual CDBG
plans, annual CDBG programs, and annual grantee performance re-
ports.23 The stated "primary objective" of the 1974 Act is to benefit
persons of low and moderate income.24 Additional goals and stated
eligible activities are specified in the legislation.25 Recipient jurisdic-
tions are also subject to federal statutory law relating to environmen-
tal quality, labor standards, equal opportunity, and relocation-so-
called "overlay statutes. 26
The Nixon and Ford Administrations advocated a system with vir-
tually no federal oversight of local decisionmaking, and administered
the CDBG program with very little federal intervention.27 HUD,
under the Carter Administration, has issued administrative regula-
tions28 that set much clearer standards for the program, and is play-
ing a more aggressive role in oversight of local jurisdictions.29
22. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 106,42 U.S.C.A. § 5306
(West Supp. 1978).
23. Id. § 5313(b).
24. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 104(d), 42 U.S.C. §
5301(c) (Supp. V 1975).
25. Id. § 5305.
26. See Uniform Relocation and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970);
Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 3, 12 U.S.C. § 1701u (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970);
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. V 1975)
(amending the 1%8 Civil Rights Act); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4601 (1970); Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1970).
27. For examples of non-enforcement of statutory requirements in the 1974 Act
under the Ford Administration, see SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, note 8 supra,
and testimony by representatives of the Southern Regional Council, Center for Com-
munity Change, Suburban Action, National Urban League and Detroit Coalition for
Block Grant Compliance in SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS-OVERSIGHT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
28. 43 Fed. Reg. 41 (1978) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570).
29. For a discussion of the politics of the CDBG regulations, see Keating & LeG-
ates, The Program Benefit Question of Community Development, 10 URB. LAW. -
(1978).
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DATA SOURCES AND METHODS
Data used in this Article were assembled for 433 of the 530 United
States metropolitan cities which will receive CDBG funds in 1980.
These 433 cities are included in those analyzed in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development Evaluation Study of the
CDBG formula. Together they accounted for approximately 95% of
the total entitlement city population in fiscal year 1976. The data set
for these cities includes information on basic demographic and socio-
economic characteristics. It also includes need indices constructed by
HUD'S division of Policy Development and Research (hereinafter
PD&R). Data were drawn directly or constructed from the following
sources: the HUD CDBG Formula Evaluation Study; unpublished
data from HUD's PD&R Division; 1967 and 1972 County and City
Data Books; and the Federal Directory of CDBG Reciients.
Estimates were made of 1980 CDBG funding under the new and
old formulas using the unpublished PD&R data, applying the as-
sumptions and procedures specified in notes thirty and thirty-nine be-
low. The same data were used in generating estimates under the
alternative impaction-adjusted formulas.
The regional classification used in this analysis is from the U.S.
Census Bureau and is identical to that employed in the Brookings
CDBG study.
The HUD need index referred to in this analysis provides a useful
overall index of community development need in metropolitan cities.
Developed by HUD's PD&R Division, the index was designed as a
summary measure of the relative variation among cities in per capita
need. Each city's score on this index is a summation of weighted fac-
tor scores on five dimensions of need: poverty, age of housing stock,
density, crime and unemployment, and lack of economic opportu-
nity. Despite its limitations (acknowledged and discussed in the
HUD report), the composite index is based on a plausible weighting
scheme and is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to warrant its use
here in combination with additional discrete indicators of community
development need. City scores on the index are used in the need
quartile classification and correlation analyses that follow.
The correlations reported below are simple Pearson product-mo-
ment correlation coefficients. This coefficient ranges in value from
-1.0 (perfect negative relationship) to + 1.0 (perfect positive relation-
ship), with values near zero indicating a non-relationship.
[Vol. 15:17
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THE CDBG FUNDING DISTRIBUTION FORMULAS
The 1974 Act contained a single CDBG distribution formula (here-
inafter Formula A), which included the factors of total population,
poverty population (double counted), and extent of housing over-
crowding.3" Between 1975 and 1977 "impact analysis" of the distri-
butional consequences of the original formula was carried out by a
number of researchers: Paul Dommel and Richard Nathan of the
Brookings Institution,3" staff of the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development,32 Professor Robert Schaefer of
Harvard University,33 analysts at the New Jersey State Department
of Urban Affairs," and the present authors.35 While the analytic
techniques employed and the distinct perspectives of these groups va-
ried, all formula research concluded that the original formula was
defective. 36 All five studies were influential in shifting the climate of
opinion in favor of formula change. Principal credit for the new ap-
proach to distribution of CDBG assistance ultimately adopted in
1977 rests with Paul Dommel of the Brookings Institution.37
30. Algebraically, Formula A may be defined as follows:
F[0.50(Pov/SMSA Pov) + 0.25(Pop/SMSA Pop) + 0.25 (Crowd/SMSA Crowd)]
where Ei = the ith metro city's entitlement;
F = total amount of formula allotment to metropolitan areas;
Pov = city's 1970 Census Poverty Count;
Pop = city's 1973 total population (to be updated to 1975);
Crowd = city's 1970 housing overcrowding, defined as the 1970 Census number of
housing units with more than 1.01 persons per room;
and SMSA Pov, SMSA Pop, SMSA Crowd, are the National SMSA amounts correspond-
ing to Pov, Pop, and Crowd, respectively.
31. See BLOCK GRANTS, note 8 supra.
32. See EVALUATION OF CDBG FORMULA, note 8 supra.
33. R. SCHAEFER, TARGETING CDBG FUrDS (1977).
34. New Jersey State Department of Public Affairs (unpublished research leading
to Wilhams Amendment-unsuccessfully proposing an impaction adjustment to the
1977 Act).
35. DeLeon & LeGates, Community Development Block Grants. Redistribution Ef-
fects and Equity Issues, 9 URB. LAW. 364 (1977). See REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS,
note 8 supra.
36. See notes 37, 65 and accompanying text infra.
37. See P. DOMMEL, THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING (1974). Dommel is an
authority on the politics of revenue sharing. He originally proposed introduction of a
"dual formula" based upon the precedent of a dual formula in General Revenue
Sharing, which had broken a congressional deadlock and made passage of the origi-
nal revenue sharing legislation possible. The dual formula Dommel originally pro-
posed was composed of population, age of housing (double weighted), and poverty.
HUD staff changed population to "population decline." Dommel did not agree with
this adaptation because it did not take account of slow growing cities and had some
19781
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The dual formula will become fully operative in 1980.38At that
time each metropolitan entitlement city will receive the higher
amount from one of two formulas: Formula A, which is exactly the
same as the old CDBG formula, or Formula B, a new "alternative"
formula created by the 1977 Act which allocates funds proportional
to the number of a city's housing units built before 1939, the number
of poor, and the amount of "growth lag" experienced by a city in
comparison with the overall population growth rate of aggregated
metropolitan city populations from 1960 to 1973. 39
Analyses of the 1974 CDBG distribution formulat provide detailed
empirical information concerning redistributive effects of the
formula.40 The normative conclusions drawn by authors from these
analyses were generally negative regarding funding shifts between re-
extreme gains for the big population losers such as St. Louis. Accordingly, Dommel
recommended to the Carter transition that "population decline" be adapted to take
account of slow growers as well as losers. Acting on this suggestion HUD staff devel-
oped the "growth lag" factor.
38. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 106,42 U.S.C.A. § 5306
(West Supp. 1978).
39. Algebraically, Formula B may be defined as follows:
F[0.50(Age/SMSA Age) + 0.30(Pov/SMSA Pov) + 0.20(GroLag/Metro Grolag)]
where Ei = the ith metro city's entitlement;
F = total amount of formula allotment to metropolitan areas;
Age = city's 1970 Census number of housing units built before 1939;
Pov = city's 1970 Census Poverty count;
and SMSA Pov, SMSA Age are the National SMSA amounts corresponding to Pov and
Age, respectively.
The growth lag component of Formula B is a complex and "dynamic" variable measur-
ing community development need. A given metro city's growth lag is calculated in several
steps. First, the total population of aggregated metropolitan cities is computed for 1960
(the base period) and for the latest year with sound census estimates (currently 1973). The
percentage change in aggregate total population from 1960 is then computed. From 1960 to
1973, for example, this percentage change was 11.288%. Any city that grew at a lesser rate
from 1960 to 1973 had growth lag. To calculate the growth lag for each city, its 1960 popu-
lation is multiplied by the aggregate percentage change (1.11288), and from this product is
subtracted the city's actual 1973 population. Treating all minus figures as zero growth lag, a
city's "GroLag" is then a city's deficit in population growth compared to what it would
have had in 1973 if it had grown at the aggregated rate of metropolitan cities. Metro
"GroLag" in Formula B above is simply the summation of individual city growth lags.
The city-level data and national SMSA totals were supplied to the authors by HUD's
PD & R Division.
In the analysis that follows and in the formula simulation to be presented later in the
paper, the figure assumed for F (total formula allotment to metropolitan areas) is $2.755
billion. This figure is derived under the assumptions of a formula allotment of $3.55 billion
($3.8 billion minus $0.25 billion set-aside), a Secretarial fund share of 3%, and a
metro/non-metro split of 8/2.
40. See notes 31-35 supra.
[Vol. 15:17
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gions of the country, between metropolitan v. non-metropolitan ar-
eas, and between classes of recipients within metropolitan areas.4 1
The formula studies documented the fact that, compared with the
distribution of assistance under the categorical system, the original
CDBG formula would have led to dramatic resource shifts between
different regions of the country if the formula had become fully oper-
ative.4'2 Funds would have shifted away from the New England and
Mid-Atlantic regions in favor of the three Southern regions (South
Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central) and the Pa-
cific region.43 The Brookings Institution study projected that recipi-
ent jurisdictions in the New England region would have experienced
a 37% decrease in funding by 1980 had the original formula become
fully operative, and jurisdictions in the West South Central region
would have experienced a 203% increase.' The Brookings Analysis
of projected per capita funding shifts among regions also showed
similar patterns of dramatic loss to New England and the Middle
Atlantic region and substantial gains in the South and West.4 These
conclusions were corroborated by the other studies.46
The principal criticism advanced against the regional shift which
the original CDBG formula would have brought about was that the
regions that would experience the greatest loss contained the oldest
large central cities, generally in the worst physical condition and ex-
periencing the most "hardship" under many sets of assumptions. It
was noted, however, that jurisdictions in the South benefited by the
formula tended to have higher proportional concentrations of poor
people living within them.47 While some theorists argue that channel-
ling federal aid into the most depressed areas is unwise and urge vari-
ous kinds of triage, dispersal and growth support strategies a4 none of
the authors of the CDBG formula studies advocated an extreme
movement of aid away from the whole regions of the country with
most severe urban problems.
41. Id.
42. Id See BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 8, at ch. 4-5.
43, BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 8, at 139.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See notes 31-35 supra.
47. BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 8, at 139.
48. DeLeon & LeGates, Community Development Block Grants: Redistribution Ef-
fects and Equity Issues, 9 URB. LAw. 364 (1977).
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With regard to the Metropolitan-Non-metropolitan area break-
down, the 1974 Act provided that, after setting aside two percent of
annual appropriations for the HUD Secretary's discretionary fund,
twenty percent of balance would be earmarked for discretionary
grants to non-metropolitan areas and eighty percent for use within
metropolitan areas.49 The Brookings Study concluded that the share
of total funding to metropolitan areas would have declined from
87.4% under the categorical system to 80% of all funds under the fully
operative formula.50 Metropolitan areas would have experienced a
slight absolute funding increase only because of an expansion in the
total amount of CDBG funding.
The principal criticism addressed to this shift relates to the in-
tended purpose of the funding. The CDBG program is intended to
address urban problems, and proportional increase of funding to
small non-metropolitan jurisdictions runs against that central pur-
pose.
Within metropolitan regions, the 1974 Act specified three classes of
recipient jurisdictions: entitlement communities, metropolitan discre-
tionary communities, and urban counties.5" Under the original 1974
formula, entitlement communities in 1980 would have received 59.1%
of metropolitan area funds," with 28% going to metropolitan discre-
tionary communities, and 12.9% to urban counties.53 Compared to
previous funding levels, this allocation would have tripled the total
going to urban counties and quadrupled the amount for metropolitan
discretionary communities. Critics of these projected intra-metropoli-
tan shifts pointed out that, in general, larger "urban" communities,
and particularly core cities (where total share of federal grants would
have dropped from 71.8 to 42.2%), - are relatively more needy than
the counties and smaller discretionary communities.
In addition to documenting different classes of damaging
macrolevel shifts which the CDBG formula would have caused, sev-
eral studies analyzed the "match" between CDBG funding levels and
quantifiable recipient needs.55 Different indices of need were used
49. 42 U.S.C. § 5306 (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977).
50. BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 8, at 179.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977).
52. See REDISTIBUTIoN EFFEcrs, supra note 8, at 180.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See notes 56-65 and accompanying text infra.
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and different analytic techniques employed, primarily correlation
and regression analysis.
The Brookings Institution study made significant use of a synthetic
need indicator earlier developed by Richard Nathan and Charles Ad-
ams--the Nathan-Adams Central City Hardship Index.5 6 Employing
this composite index as one evaluation tool, Dommel and Nathan
concluded that 1974 formula was not particularly responsive to dif-
ferences in hardship among cities.17 Newark, New Jersey, for exam-
ple, with a hardship index score of 422 would have suffered a 52.2%
decrease in 1980 funding,5" while Ft. Lauderdale, with a hardship
index score of only 64, would have experienced a 436.4% gain.59 In
general, Nathan and Dommel found the 1974 formula to be least re-
sponsive to physical dimension of community development need.
The DeLeon-LeGates study6° articulated several distinct commu-
nity development strategies, selected a number of discrete need in-
dicators appropriate for evaluating the 1974 formula from each
strategic perspective, and concluded from an analysis of national and
California data that (1) the general direction of funding shifts was
from the more needy to the less needy cities, and (2) the pattern of
allocations generated by the formula was (a) superior to the categori-
cal system in addressing needs linked to poverty and racial impac-
tion, but (b) severely deficient in addressing both physical and fiscal
community development needs.6 1 The study called for a new formula
incorporating a broader range of need indicators and responding
more effectively to the intensity vis-a-vis the magnitude of a city's
hardship.62
The HUD formula evaluation study63 used several need indexes,
including the composite need index referred to in subsequent sections
of this Article. Extensive regression and correlation analyses corrobo-
rated the evidence of other studies regarding deficiencies contained in
56. Nathan & Adams, Understanding Central City Hardsho, 91 POL. ScI. Q. 47
(1976).
57. See BLOCK GRANTS, supra note 8, at 158-59.
58. Id. at 158.
59. Id. at 159.
60. DeLeon & LeGates, Community Development Block Grants: Redistribution Ef-
fects and Equity Issues, 9 URB. LAW. 364 (1977).
61. Id. at 376-81.
62. Id. at 389.
63. U.S. DEP'T HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION, AN
EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM (1977).
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the 1974 formula.6' New formula designs were tested (including
those proposed by the Brookings study) and most were found to be
distinctly superior to the 1974 formula in targeting resources to
needs.6" In sum, the major conclusion drawn from these various eval-
uation studies indicated that the 1974 formula was extremely defi-
cient, that the categorical system achieved better results in some
respects but worse in most, and that new improved CDBG formulas
were both possible and desirable.
THE NEW DUAL FORMULA
The dual formula adopted in 1977 significantly changes the distri-
bution of CDBG aid and responds to some of the major criticisms
directed against the original formula. By adding an optional second
formula (Formula B), the dual formula creates very substantial per-
centage and per capita increases in entitlements to jurisdictions
within those regions of the country that would have experienced the
most severe cuts by 1980 had the original CDBG formula, Formula
A, become fully operative.66 For example, jurisdictions within New
England receive an aggregate eighty-six percent increase in 1980 enti-
tlements over the old formula amount.67 Retention of the original
CDBG formula as an option protects other regions from substantial
losses that would have occurred if the Formula B had been wholly
substituted for Formula A. For example, jurisdictions within the
West South Central region would have experienced an aggregate
thirty-three percent cut in funding if Formula B were substituted for
Formula A. This is illustrated in Table 1.
The data shown in Table 1 also display a thematic pattern, which
will be elaborated in several ways and in greater detail in the sections
below. Specifically, the "option" provided by the dual formula is pri-
marily intended to protect against funding cuts in what the HUD
evaluation study calls a potential "new class of losers" among metro-
politan cities located predominantly in the Southern and Western re-
gions. A direct substitution of Formula B for Formula A would
scarcely affect allocations to metropolitan cities in the Northeastern
and North Central regions but would involve major redistribution of
64. Id. at 47-89.
65. Id. at 90-107.
66. See table I in text infra.
67. 1d.
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TABLE I
Aggregate Percentage and Per Capita Changes in 1980 Funding in the Shift from the
Original to the Dual Formula Compared with Funding Changes From the
Original Formula to Formula B Alone
1 2 3 4
Region* % aggregate $ per capita % aggregate $ per capita
increase in aggregate increase in aggregated
entitlements increase old entitlements increase from
from old to dual from old old formula
formula to formula formula to to Formula B
dual formula Formula B alone
alone
New England +86% +$15 +86% +$15
Mid-Atlantic +71% +S16 +71% +$16
East North Central +68% +$14 +64% +$13
West North Central +65% +$12 +61% +$11
South Atlantic +16% +$ 3 - 5% -$ 2
East South Central +14% +$ 4 -13% -$ 3
West South Central + 3% 0 -33% -$ 8
Mountain + 9% +$ 2 -28% -$ 4
Pacific +20% +$ 3 - 7% -$ 2
* Regional divisions used by the U.S. Bureau of the Census are: New England-Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; Middle Atlan-
tic -New York. New Jersey, Pennsylvania; East North Central-Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan. Wisconsin; West North Central-Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota,
South Dakota. Nebraska. Kansas; South Atlantic-Delaware, Maryland, District of Colum-
bia. Virginia. West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida; East South
Central -Kentuck, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi; West South Central-Arkansas, Lou-
isiana Oklahoma Texas; Mountain -Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona Utah, Nevada;, Pacific-Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
funds from metropolitan cities in other regions. To avoid creating
this "new class of losers" the dual formula builds a minimum funding
floor under these entitlement cities.
The 1977 Act does not alter the proportions of funding allocated to
non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas.68 Criticisms advanced
68. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 106,42 U.S.C.A. § 5306
(West Supp. 1978). This section does not alter the 80%/20% split established in the
1974 version of the act. 42 U.S.C. § 5306 (Supp. V 1975).
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against the original formula as devoting too much proportional bene-
fit to non-metropolitan jurisdictions still hold.69
Construction of a formula to distribute federal community devel-
opment assistance must confront the fact that physical deterioration
problems (as measured by an objective need indicator such as the
number of housing units built before 1939) and social problems (as
measured by such indicators as income and race) are somewhat in-
dependent of each other and are unequally distributed regionally. A
formula attempting to precisely target areas where physical deteriora-
tion problems are concentrated (as in many New Jersey cities) runs
the risk of doing so by shifting funds away from areas containing
proportionately fewer old housing units but proportionately more
TABLE 2
Coefficients of Correlation between Selected Need Indicators and Per Capita Funding
under the Categorical Program, the Previous CDBG Formula (Formula
A), The New Alternative Formula (Formula B), and the
Dual Formula (433 Metropolitan Cities)
$ Per Capita $ Per Capita
Prior $ Per Capita $ Per Capita Dual
Categoricala Formula Ab Formula Bb Formulab
(1) Percent individuals .22 .95 .35 .52
below low income
level
(2) Percent Negro of .24 .68 .35 .42
total 1970 popula-
tion
(3) Percent housing .37 .15 .84 .73
units built pre-
1939
(4) Percent housing -. 01 .65 -. 08 .11
with 1.01 persons
or more per room
(5) Local taxes per .23 .01 .35 .27
capita 1969
(6) HUD Need index .39 .80 .76 .81
a 1970 total population figures used-categorical funds are average annualized figure.
for the period 1968-1972.
b 1973 total population figures used.
69. This is ultimately a normative question concerning the purposes of federal
community development legislation-whether it is urban legislation primarily, or ad-
dressed to all communities.
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poor people and minorities. An examination of coefficients of corre-
lation between need indicators and the amounts of funds distributed
by various formulas contained in the new dual system clarifies this
important dilemma.
Table 2 indicates that the original CDBG formula (Formula A)
achieved a superior match between the distribution of funds and key
social need indicators, but an inferior match with the leading indica-
tor of physical quality (percent of housing units built pre-1939). In
contrast, Formula B alone would achieve a much superior match be-
tween funds and physical deterioration as measured by pre-1939
housing units, but at the cost of an inferior match between funding
and the three leading indicators of social needs. Adoption of the dual
formula is intended to "balance" these objectives, and indeed the cor-
relation results generally moderate the extremes produced by either
formula alone. The dual formula achieves a superior match between
resources and all indicators of need than did the categorical system.
In addition, it appears to strike a reasonable balance between ad-
dressing physical development and social needs, although how effi-
ciently this is achieved will be a major theme of later parts of this
Article.
The effects of the change upon individual cities illustrate the gen-
eral positive direction of change achieved by the new dual formula.
Table 3 presents information on the per capita funding allocated to
the ten "most needy" and ten "least needy" cities of more than
250,000 population.
Half of the ten "most needy" large cities could have experienced
funding cuts from their prior categorical level by 1980 had the origi-
nal CDBG formula become fully operative.7° The cuts would have
been substantial for some very large and/or quite needy cities. New-
ark, for example, would have received a per capita cut from $54 to
$32 and Boston from $47 to $22.7 ' All of the most needy large cities
will receive significant per capita increases in funding under the dual
formula.72 In some cases this will lag behind what they previously
received under the categorical system (Newark and Boston), but in
other cases there will be more than full restoration (for example, Buf-
falo will more than double its funding).
70. See table 3 in text infra.
71. Id.
72, Id.
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TABLE 3
Comparisons of Per Capita Funding Under the Categorial Program, Formula A, and
the New Dual Formula in the 10 Most Needy and 10 Least Needy Large
Cities*
Rank on S Per Capita S Per Capita
HUD Need Prior $ Per Capita Dual
Most Needy Cities Index Categorical Formula A Formula
Newark, NJ 5 $54 $32 $44
St. Louis, MO 12 24 32 66
New Orleans, LA 13 24 35 39
New York, NY 23 13 24 34
Cleveland, OH 26 21 25 59
Boston, MA 28 47 22 41
Buffalo, NY 30 25 21 58
Jersey City, NJ 38 25 23 42
San Francisco, CA 41 40 22 42
Birmingham, AL 43 16 30 41
Least Needy Cities
San Jose, CA 364 $15 $14 $14
Phoenix, AZ 334 2 18 18
Tucson, AZ 311 21 19 19
Indianapolis, IN 300 19 17 17
Tulsa, OK 299 28 17 17
Wichita, KS 297 45 18 19
San Diego, CA 294 13 17 17
Albuquerque, NM 277 39 19 19
Omaha, NB 260 2 16 16
Ft. Worth, TX 258 4 22 22
* Cities having a total 1973 population of 250,000 or more.
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None of the "least needy" ten largest cities receives any increase in
funding as a result of the dual formula, with the single exception of a
$1 per capita increase in Wichita, Kansas. Table 3 also contains sug-
gestive information illustrating weaknesses of both the categorical
system and the original CDBG formula. Note, for example, that Al-
buquerque, New Mexico-a large city having a very low score on the
HUD need index-was receiving more than twice as much categori-
cal aid as justified by either Formula A or B, illustrating the whimsi-
cal nature of the categorical grant system. Note also that Phoenix,
Arizona, another large city rating very low on the needs index, re-
ceived a 900% windfall increase in per capita funding under Formula
A. This will not be reduced by the new formula.
TOWARDS "EQUITABLE EFFICIENCY" IN COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
The 1977 Act requires the Secretary of HUD report to Congress by
September 30, 1978, with respect to the adequacy, effectiveness, and
equity of the formula used for allocating CDBG funds, with specific
analysis and recommendation as to the feasibility of utilizing factors
of impactions (such as adjusted age of housing and extent of poverty)
as a measurement consideration. 73 "Impaction" is defined by the Act
as meaning the impaction measured in terms of absolute number and
proportions of each need factor. 74 Detailed simulations of alternative
formulae are being undertaken by HUD.71 This section will discuss
some approaches worthy of detailed study and advance some tenta-
tive conclusions regarding the likely consequences of the studies.
Analytic categories developed in the analysis of income mainte-
nance systems are helpful in approaching the questions which Con-
gress has posed to HUD. Theodore Marmor, in an essay concerning
income maintenance systems, develops the concept of "equitable effi-
ciency. In making policy comparisons, certain programs for dis-
tributing social welfare assistance are seen as more "efficient" than
73. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 106(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §
5306(1) (West Supp. 1978).
74. Id.
75. James Broughman, Director of the Office of Statistics within HUD's Office of
Community Planning and Development, is overseeing additional HUD CDBG
formula research. Interview with James Broughman, in Washington, D.C., Decem-
ber 21, 1977.
76. Marmon, On Comparing Income Maintenance Alternatives, 65 Am. POL. ScI.
REv. 83 (1971). See also Weisbrod, Collective Action and the Distribution of Income:
A ConceptualApproach, in I THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC ExPENDI-
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others in targeting resources to identifiable needs. A program in-
tended to improve equity is maximally "efficient" in Marmor's terms
if it reaches all of those with need and none others.77 To the extent
that a program fails to reach all of those with need it is "horizontally
inefficient." If it produces "spillovers" to non-needy recipients, then it
is "vertically inefficient.
78
The original Formula A distributed large amounts of aid to juris-
dictions having little need for assistance, an instance of severe verti-
cal inefficiency. It also distributed relatively small amounts of aid to
those jurisdictions heavily or primarily afflicted by physical commu-
nity development needs, Ze., it was also horizontally inefficient.
The major contribution of the dual formula is to improve the hori-
zontal efficiency of the allocation system, mainly by enlarging the pot
and distributing much of the increment consistent with physical de-
velopment needs. The principal deficiency of the dual formula is that
it does not correct the vertical inefficiency produced by the original
formula, ie., it does not take back the significant amount of funds
given to low need jurisdictions who should not have received funding
in the first place.
The vertical efficiency problem is essentially a political one. "Verti-
cal inefficiency" is highly correlated with the extent of "protected"
CDBG assistance--the funding that continues to flow to jurisdictions
as a result of retaining original Formula A. Table 4 shows that this
"protected" CDBG aid is unequally distributed among regions.
Within the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions there are no
cities that would lose a great deal of per capita funding ($8 or more)
if Formula A were dropped and Formula B were used exclusively,
and few cities that would suffer even modest losses. The majority
(71% in the Mid-Atlantic; 50% in the New England states) would
have received great gains (more than $15 per capita). In other re-
gions---the West South Central again being the most striking-the
pattern is nearly opposite.
At the national level any attempt to reduce "protected" CDBG
assistance to achieve greater vertical equity would likely run into po-
litical obstacles in Congress. If Senators and Congressmen voted in
the financial interests of their electoral districts, any attempt to in-
TURES: THE PPB SYSTEM, A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS, SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY IN
GOv'T, JoINr ECON. COMM., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (Comm. Print 1969).
77. See Marmon, supra note 76, at 87.
78. Id. at 88.
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TABLE 4
Formula A Cities by Magnitude of Protected Loss* and Formula B Cities by Magnitude
of Achieved Gain ($ Per Capita): Distribution by Region and Need
Quartiles
FORMULA A CITIES FORMULA B CITIES
Great
Protection Modest Great
(Would Protection Modest Gain
lose $8 (Would Gain (up (more
P/C or lose up to to $15 than $15
Region more) $8 P/C) P/C) P/C) Total** N
New England 0% 11% 39% 50% 100% 44
Mid-Atlantic 0 6 24 71 101 51
East North Central 6 23 40 31 100 83
West North Central 7 35 41 17 100 29
South Atlantic 33 40 17 10 100 58
East South Central 33 44 11 11 99 18
West South Central 55 29 14 2 100 51
Mountain 47 37 11 5 100 19
Pacific 33 46 19 3 101 80
Need:
() Lowest Need 40% 44% 16% 1% 101% 108
Quartile
(2) 17 37 38 8 100 107
(3) 17 26 28 30 101 109
(4) Highest Need 1 1 20 54 100 109
Quartile
Total Total
N=95 N=127
Total Total
N=ll0 N=101
* Per Capita loss if Formula B had been made a straight substitute for Formula A.
Percentage totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
crease vertical efficiency would split Congress along essentially re-
gional lines. Attempts to increase the metropolitan as opposed to
non-metropolitan proportional share of funding would split Congress
along essentially rural-urban lines. In addition, any attempt to dimin-
ish the "urban county" share of funding would split Congress along
essentially urban-suburban lines.
While the politics of instituting a single formula that achieves both
horizontal and vertical efficiency may be difficult, empirical analysis
Total
N=433
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of need indicators and simulations of the funding outcomes of alter-
native formulas (including several variations of the "impaction ad-
justment" concept) provide essential bases for informed
policymaking. Differences between normative interpretation of what
is desirable, and political judgment concerning what compromises
must be struck, can proceed on a more informed footing.
Central to analyzing the problem of vertical efficiency is informa-
tion concerning the extent to which cities tend to have high physical
needs alone, high social needs alone, or high combined needs. Table
5 presents information on indicators of need broken down by
Formula A and Formula B cities.
TABLE 5
Mean Scores on Selected Need Indicators by Type of City, Formula A or Formula B
FORMULA A FORMULA B
Great Modest Modest Gain Great Gain
Protection Protection
(N = 95) (N = 127) (N = 110) (N=101)
(1) Percent individuals 14% 12% 11% 13%
below low income level
(2) Percent Negro of total 13% 10% 12% 14%
1970 population
(3) Percent housing units 14% 27% 49% 71%
built pre-1939
(4) Percent housing units
with 1.01 persons or 10% 6% 7% 6%
more per room
(5) Local taxes per capita, $60 $83 $119 $134
1969
(6) HUD NEED index -. 203 -. 183 .025 .396
In general, Table 5 shows that Formula B cities tend to have high
levels of both physical and social needs. Formula A cities on the av-
erage have very low levels of physical needs, but clearly a large
number of Formula A cities have great social needs. This subset of
Formula A recipients would have been severely penalized by funding
cuts, and "protecting" them from such loss can be justified. But is
vertical inefficiency a price which must necessarily be paid to mini-
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mize the inequities created by the dual formula? Must the unneedy
be protected along with the needy? Simulation of impaction adjust-
ments sheds light upon this important question.
A comparison of two large Southern cities will illustrate the logic
and purpose of a formula impaction adjustment. In 1970 New Orle-
ans had a total population of 593,471 and a poor population of
155,938.79 Houston had a total population of 1,232,407 and a poor
population of 171,706.80 Under Formula B, three-tenths of the total
metropolitan entitlement funds will be distributed in direct propor-
tion to a jurisdiction's share of the national SMSA total number of
poor.8 On that basis, if the jurisdictions included only Houston and
New Orleans, Houston would receive 52% of the money, New Orle-
ans 48%. This distributive outcome occurs because Formula B
considers only one dimension of poverty impaction, magnitude, mea-
sured by the sheer numbers of poor in each city.82 It neglects a second
important dimension of impaction, intensity, measured by the
percentage of a city's population that is poor. By the percentage
measure New Orleans is much more "impacted" (26%) than is Hous-
ton (14%). These percentages also reflect a contextual difference be-
tween the two cities. Specifically, the ratio of non-poor to poor in
New Orleans is 2.85 (74/26) whereas in Houston it is 6.14 (86/14).
These ratios indicate much greater local capacity to deal with
problems of poverty in Houston than in New Orleans. Formula B's
one-dimensional emphasis on the magnitude of poverty impaction
neglects these important contextual differences in local resource ca-
pacity.
An impaction adjustment can help to correct these kinds of defi-
ciencies in the current formula. Such an adjustment can take several
different forms (e.g., threshold factors, weights determined by na-
tional averages, or sliding weights). The simulations conducted in this
study employed a sliding weight. 3 A sliding weight adjustment
79. COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK (1972) (table 6).
80, Id.
81. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 106(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §
5306(b) (West Supp. 1978).
82. Id.
83. This sliding weight should not be confused with the fixed weights contained in
Formula B (0.5 times Age., 0.3 times Pov., etc.). Those fixed weights reflect the rela-
tive priorities assigned by policymakers to age of housing, poverty and growth lag as
components of community development need. The fixed weights assign priorities to
types of need, the raw totals reflect magnitude of need, and the sliding weights re-
spond to intensity of need.
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would involve multiplying ("weighting") each city's number of poor
by its percentage poor. Thus, Houston's total number of poor would
be multiplied by .14, New Orleans' by .26. New Orleans' poor popu-
lation is weighted more than Houston's-that is, the weight is varia-
ble and "slides" to reflect the difference in the intensity of poverty
impaction between the two cities. Houston's total weighted number of
poor is 24,039, now exceeded by New Orleans' total of 40,544. If ju-
risdictions included only these two cities and, if funding were now
made proportional to the city's share of total weighted number of
poor, New Orleans would receive 63% of the funds, Houston 37%.
Assuming a fixed amount of total funds, New Orleans would gain
significantly from an impaction-adjusted formula and Houston
would lose. Simulations were undertaken in which Formula B is al-
tered to produce three distinct impaction-adjusted formulas for com-
parison and analysis: (1) Formula X, with a sliding weight for age of
housing stock; (2) Formula Y, with sliding weights both for age of
housing stock and poverty population; and (3) Formula Z, with a
sliding weight for poverty population alone.84
84. Formula X may be defined algebraically as follows:
433 433 433
Ei = F[(0.5)J(ai)(Agei)/ I (ai)(Agei)] + (0.3)[Povi/ Y Povi] + (0.2)[GroLagi/ GroLagill.i=I j=I i=l
Formula Y is: 433 433 433
Ei = F[(0.5)[(a-)(Agei)/ Y (ai)(Agei)] + (0.3)[(Pi)(Pov i) / X (P i)(Povi)] + (0.2)[GroLagi/ Y GroLai=1 i=1I i=1
Formula Z is: 433 433 433
Ei = F[(0.5)[Agei/ I Agei] + (0.3)[(Pi)(Povi)/ Y (Pi)(Povi)] + (0.2)[GroLagi/ GroLagi]
where
Ei = 1980 entitlements received by ith metro city;
F = aggregate total 1980 CDBG funds allocated to 433 cities (=$1.895 billion in
all formula simulations);
ai = percent of housing units built pre-1939 in ith city;
Pi = percent of population below low income level in ith city;
and
Ages, Povi and GroLag i are as defined in note 18 supra.
Analysis of results generated by these three formulas is restricted for the most part to
a comparison with 1980 funding estimates using the current Formula B. The impac-
tion-adjusted formulas could alter the total metro city share of 1980 metropolitan area
funds. Data are not available to measure the effects of formula change on the size of
this share. To simplify comparisons, (1) only aggregate totals for the 433 cities are
used rather than national SMSA totals, and (2) the 433-city total 1980 funding ($1.895
billion) generated by Formula B is used as the base amount to be allocated in each
situation.
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The results of simulation runs using the three impaction-adjusted
formulas suggest preliminary answers to the following questions:
(1) To what extent would an impaction adjustment improve
Formula B's match of federal resources to local needs?
(2) In addressing different types of community development
need, what are the particular advantages and limitations of each im-
paction-adjusted formula?
(3) Would impaction adjustments discernibly improve the verti-
cal efficiency of the present allocation formula without sacrificing the
gains achieved in horizontal efficiency?
(4) What would be the likely effects of impaction adjustments on
the regional distribution of CDBG funds?
(5) Can a single formula be developed that would eliminate the
vertically inefficient "protection" afforded by the current dual
TABLE 6
Coefficients of Correlation Between Selected Need Indicators and 1980 Per Capita
Funding under Formula B and Three Impaction-Adjusted Simulated
Formulas (N = 433)
Need Indicators Formula B Formula X Formula Y Formula Z
(Impaction (Impaction (Impaction
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
for Age of for Age of for Poverty)
Housing) Housing and
Poverty)
(1) Percent individuals .36 .31 .51 .62
below low income level
(2) Percent Negro of total 35 .27 .35 .45
1970 population
(3) Percent housing units 84 .89 .8 .75
built pre-1939
(4) Percent housing units
with 1.01 persons or -. 08 -. 10 .08 .15
more per room
(5) Local taxes per capita 35 .37 .32 .28
1969
.76 .74 .83
19781
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formula without causing damaging funding cuts in the 1980 entitle-
ments going to needy cities?
Impaction adjustments can improve the match of federal resources
to local needs. Of the three types of adjustment analyzed here, the
poverty-impaction adjustment contained in Formula Z is superior.
Table 6 shows coefficients of correlation between selected need in-
dicators and 1980 per capita funding under Formula B and the three
impaction-adjusted formulas.
At the time of the 1977 Act the Senate bill included a housing im-
paction adjustment introduced by Senator Williams of New Jersey.85
The provision was eliminated by Senate-House conferees.86 Simula-
tions suggest that such a housing impaction adjustment is the least
promising single formula alternative to the present dual formula sys-
tem.
By comparison with Formula B, Formula X further increases the
correlation between CDBG funding and the physical needs of cit-
ies-but at the price of further diminishing the correlation between
funding and social needs. The correlation with percent of housing
units built pre-1939 increases from .84 to .89; the correlation with
percent of individuals below low income drops from .36 to .31. This
pattern accentuates the strength and exacerbates the weakness of
Formula B. By itself, a housing impaction adjustment would make
protection of funding to cities with social needs even more necessary.
Formula Y contains impaction adjustments for both housing and
poverty. Compared with Formula B, it increases the responsiveness
of federal funding to social needs without greatly diminishing re-
sponsiveness to physical needs. The correlation with HUD's compos-
ite need index exceeds that of the dual formula and demonstrates that
a single formula can achieve balance in addressing both physical and
social needs. Comparing Formula X and Formula Y, the message is
clear that any proposal for a housing impaction adjustment should
also be accompanied by one for a poverty impaction adjustment in
order to offset imbalances that otherwise would occur.
Based on the correlation results shown in Table 7, Formula Z-the
impaction adjustment for poverty alone-yields the most balanced
and most responsive allocation pattern achieved by any of the formu-
lae considered in this Article. Formula Z produces the highest corre-
85. S. 1523, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1977), contained the Williams impaction.
adjustment.
86. Section 106 of the 1977 Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5306 (West Supp. 1978), does not
contain an impaction adjustment.
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TABLE 7
Comparison of Formula B and Formula Z: Frequency Distribution of "Protected" Cities
and Gaming Cities Broken Down by Need Quartiles
FORMULA B
"Protected"* Gaining**
Great Modest
Protection Protection Great Gain
(would lose (would lose Modest Gain (more than
$8 per capita up to $8 per (up to $15 $15 per cap-
Need Quartiles or more) capita) per capita) ita)
(1) Lowest Need 45% 37% 16% 1%
(2) 19 32 37 8
(3) 19 22 27 33
(4) Highest Need 17 9 20 58
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=95) (N=127) (N=110) (N=101)
FORMULA Z
"Protected"*** Gaining****
Great Modest
Need Quartiles Protection Protection Modest Gain Great Gain
(1) Lowest Need 77% 28% 9% 0%
(2) 18 36 33 3
(3) 3 30 33 26
(4) Highest Need 3 7 25 71
Totals 101% 101% 100% 100%
(N=77) (N=132) (N=132) (N=92)
Per capita loss if Formula B had been made a straight substitute for Formula A.
** Per capita gain if Formula B had been made a straight substitute for Formula A.
*** Per capita loss if Formula Z had been made a straight substitute for Formula A.
Per capita gain if Formula Z had been made a straight substitute for Formula A.
1978)
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lation (.88) with the HUD need index. It is only slightly less
responsive than Formula B to physical housing needs. Also, it is sig-
nificantly more responsive to poverty and racial impaction.
Compared to the technically clumsier, although politically inge-
nious, dual formula structure (see Table 2 above), Formula Z
achieves higher correlations with every need indicator, including
HUD's composite need index. Formula Z thus seems to be the most
promising single formula alternative to the dual formula system-an
alternative that adds to horizontal efficiency and markedly improves
vertical efficiency.
To further test the vertical efficiency claims made for Formula Z,
let us imagine that Formula Z is substituted for Formula B in the
present dual formula structure with Formula A continuing to func-
tion as a protective bulwark against funding cuts. If the same divid-
ing lines are used to differentiate degrees of protection and gain, and
if Formula Z is indeed more vertically efficient than Formula B, then
we would expect to find that the mostprotected cities under Formula
Z are also the least needy ones. Such is the pattern that would result
if Formula Z threatened to cut funds only in cities where needs were
small and protection least justified. By this interpretation, Table 7
shows Formula Z to be dramatically superior to Formula B in verti-
cal efficiency. Under Formula B, 36% of the most protected cities are
in the two highest need quartiles. Formula A protects against funding
cuts in these cities but does so "inefficiently" by also protecting cities
having relatively little need. Formula Z reduces that figure to 6% and
also places a high proportion (71% versus 58%) of those cities achiev-
ing the greatest gains in the highest need quartile. By this analysis, if
the impaction-adjusted Formula Z were substituted for Formula B,
the "protection" offered by the dual formula system could be justified
only on (political?) grounds unrelated to considerations of need.
Table 8 shows the regional distribution patterns in mean per capita
funding that would be produced by the three impaction-adjusted for-
mulas. Compared to Formula B, Formula X directs more federal
money to regions with the greatest physical housing impaction (New
England, Mid-Atlantic) and away from regions with greatest poverty
impaction (South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central).
Formula Y yields somewhat smaller gains to the Northeast, a modest
overall increase in funding to the South, and funding cuts on the av-
erage to cities in the North Central and Western regions. Formula Z
would produce sizeable average gains in the South, particularly in the
West South Central region, and would impose modest cuts in the
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TABLE 8
Mean $ Per Capita Funding Under Formula B and Three Impaction-Adjusted
Formulas* By Region
Region Formula B Formula X Formula Y Formula Z
New England $30 $33 $32 $28
Mid-Atlantic 41 46 45 39
East North Central 24 24 23 23
West North Central 21 21 19 20
South Atlantic 21 19 21 23
East South Central 21 19 22 25
West South Central 17 15 20 22
Mountain 12 11 10 12
Pacific 12 11 9 12
* See note 83 for exact formulas.
Northeastern and North Central regions. CDBG impaction adjust-
ments would not create major disruptions in politically significant
regional allocation patterns. This suggests that adoption of a single
formula based on impaction adjustments is politically possible.
To conclude this section, preliminary analysis suggests that
formula impaction adjustments can substantially improve the cyber-
netic core of the CDBG allocation system. Of the alternatives consid-
ered, an impaction adjustment for poverty would give the best overall
results in terms of balanced responsiveness, vertical efficiency, and
regional equity. A single formula (designed along the lines of
Formula Z) is a desirable and feasible alternative to the current dual
formula system. Obviously, further investigation of these and other
formula alternatives is necessary before drawing any firm conclusions
and recommendations. But preliminary analysis suggests that the
dual formula should and can be replaced with a single formula that is
adjusted for poverty impaction using sliding weights.
A less desirable alternative to adopting a single formula with ap-
propriate impaction adjustments would be to "cap" the amount of
funding for some cities. Cities with low levels of need (as indicated by
the HUD or other index) require certain levels of CDBG funding.
Any funding increase could be capped, preventing the city from re-
1978)
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ceiving additional funds for a fixed period. For example, all jurisdic-
tions in the bottom quartile of the HUD need index which received a
$5 increase in per capita funding between 1975 and 1980 might ap-
propriately be "capped" at their 1980 entitlement amount for a speci-
fied number of years. Those in next quartile which received $10
increases might be capped, and so forth.
"Lagged" cutting or capping is also possible, which would defer
the impact of specified cuts or caps for a certain period of time. This
has certain planning and policy advantages since a community could
adjust its programs to a projected cut or cap. A "lagged" cutting or
capping strategy also has political advantages. Experience of defer-
ring impacts in order to achieve legislation is illustrated in the context
of the CDBG program itself. The initial Nixon "Better Communi-
ties" legislation proposed an immediate cut for many cities from the
categorical "prior program level" to their formula entitlement (under
a severe cutting formula)., 7 That legislation failed. "Hold harmless"
provisions deferring cuts for a three-year period were introduced in
compromise legislation aimed generally at broadening the base of
support for the legislation. The legislation passed just before an elec-
tion (August 1974) with the ultimate outcome implicitly conditioned
on the outcome of the election. That is, "phase down" entitlement
jurisdictions were "held harmless" for a period running over into the
next presidential term and congressional election period. Had Gerald
Ford won the election and carried with him a significant conservative
Congress, there is little doubt that the "hold harmless" cities would
have experienced the devastating cuts now largely mitigated by the
dual formula.
One symmetrical approach would impose projected cuts (or caps)
of CDBG funding to some cities "lagged" to take effect after the 1980
presidential election. Whether or not the cut or cap would go into
effect could turn on national electoral politics.
The Secretary of HUD, acting through the Assistant Secretary for
Community Planning and Development, may impose administrative
regulations consistent with the stated goals of the CDBG legisla-
tion. 8 Absent legislative reform to reduce vertical inefficiency, ad-
87. The Nixon Administration's original "Better Communities" legislation was
first introduced as S. 2333, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and H.R. 8835, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971). Subsequent modified versions of the original legislation were repeatedly
introduced without success between 1971 and 1974.
88. The Secretary of HUD is authorized to make "such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out his functions, powers, and duties" by the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1970).
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ministrative action to protect against its likely bad effects is clearly in
order. Treating different classes of recipients differently, so long as
the treatment is based on a rational reason and is not discriminatory
or improperly motivated, is clearly legal.89 In current HUD CDBG
regulations, different standards are applied to discretionary cities, en-
titlement jurisdictions, and urban counties.
One rational basis for regulation is classification by funding
amounts and/or increases. For example, HUD legally could impose
different CDBG performance standards for all cities which had ex-
perienced more than $1,000,000 funding increase over the last three
years.9 Another rational basis is classification by need indica-
tors-imposing a different standard upon cities with low "need" as
measured by standard methodologically sound indices such as the
Nathan-Adams Metropolitan Hardship Index or the HUD Need In-
dex. Different standards based upon funding considered together
with need is also possible.
Extreme and rapid funding increases warrant higher standards of
administrative scrutiny and performance. Determination on the basis
of objective measures that a locality has a low level of need would
warrant administrative imposition of more rigorous performance
standards. A suburban jurisdiction with a white population, high tax
base, and new housing and infrastructure can and should be held to
higher standard of community development performance, with re-
spect to meeting the stated primary goal of benefiting low and moder-
ate income people, than a distressed inner city.
BEYOND CYBERNETIC FEDERALISM
Within the framework and logic of the existing system of "cyber-
netic federalism" in Community Development, much can be done to
achieve equitable efficiency. But there are limits to what cybernetics
can accomplish. It is structurally impossible for any formula to en-
capsulate the complexity of physical development problems in Amer-
ican cities or for "cybernetic federalism" alone to meet highly diverse
needs of American cities.
Bernard Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, in a recent important book,
call for a "three-part approach" to the distribution of federal urban
aid, concluding that there is a role for each of three major ap-
proaches:
89. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 70's (1976).
90. Id.
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The basic components of the present inventory-general reve-
nue sharing, special revenue sharing, and the remaining categor-
ical grants-are surprisingly capable of responding, in
combination, to the political and administrative needs high-
lighted by the model cities experience. What is needed is a delib-
erate federal strategy that recognizes the continuing, special
claims of poverty populations to a fair share of national re-
sources, and a willingness to deploy the three types of federal aid
in accordance with this strategy.
91
While retaining the "cybernetic core" of the CDBG distribution
system, the U.S. should move "beyond cybernetic federalism" to a
balanced system of federal aid where the powerful tool of computer
information and logic is put in proper balance. The CDBG system
should be structured to respond to accretions of knowledge develop-
ing (painfully and imperfectly) within HUD, the articulated needs
and desires of intended beneficiaries of the assistance, and the in-
formed pressures of advocates of inchoate interests.
Additional formula changes within the framework of "cybernetic
federalism" should be accompanied by legislative and/or administra-
tive changes to open up the decisionmaking process to a broader
range of human factors and influences.
Large public serving bureaucracies develop specialized institu-
tional competency to deal with questions within their purview.
Within limits, HUD has an institutional capacity to make significant
decisions concerning the allocation of CDBG funds. Within limits,
HUD staff with experience in implementing HUD programs and fa-
miliarity with individual applicant jurisdictions can make informed
decisions about whether or not to provide funds to a given jurisdic-
tion, which encompass a much richer set of considerations than those
contained in the CDBG formula(s). Additional subtle quantitative
need indicators appropriate to a given locality may be included in the
decisions of knowledgeable staff. Qualitative judgments are also im-
portant for effective decisionmaking. Local government capacity to
implement programs is an obvious example of a highly relevant vari-
able virtually impossible to define quantitatively.
A certain percentage of block grant funding should be set aside for
discretionary funding to entitlement jurisdictions beyond that distrib-
uted by entitlement. The advantage of such a system is that funds
could be given out on a flexible, non-mechanical basis that both re-
91. B. FRIEDEN & M. KAPLAN, THE POLITICS OF NEGLECr (1977).
[Vol. 15:17
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol15/iss1/3
BEYOND CYBERNETIC FEDERALISM
flects the full array of need indicators and HUD judgments regarding
such qualitative factors as local jurisdiction capacity.
Discretionary grant authority should be retained for those catego-
ries of activity within the range of institutional competence of the
organization.92 Increased discretion should be expanded in areas over
which HUD, for example, may exercise reasonable control. Thus far,
retention and expansion of discretionary grant authority as a part of
the CDBG program has only partially honored this principle. Discre-
tionary grant authority over non-metropolitan grants remains with
HUD.93 HUD field staff with personal knowledge of the needs and
capacities of myriad rural and semi-rural jurisdictions are better able
than a computer system to make judgments as to where discretionary
funding will do the most good. And, HUD is able to monitor and
exercise control over rather small, discrete grants to jurisdictions
which do not have strong enough bases of political power to disre-
gard HUD.
The 1977 Act, however, created a class of discretionary grant
assistance for Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG's)-large
grants to large distressed cities to aid in large-scale economic devel-
opment activities.94 This is precisely the type of assistance program
beyond HUD's institutional capacity to wisely allocate and oversee.
These funds should be allocated by formula. While not phrased in
those terms, whether to allocate most of the eventual UDAG money
by formula (as impaction adjustment) or as discretionary grants,
deadlocked the Congressional Conference Committee on the 1977
Act for several months.
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Beyond the use of institutionalized bureaucratic capacity to intro-
duce extra-cybernetic values into the CDBG allocation process, the
CDBG system can be restructured to permit intended consumers of
92. LeGates, Can the Social Welfare Bureaucracies Control Their Programs" The
Case of HUD and Urban Renewal, 5 URB. LAW. 228 (1973). HUD, for example, is a
weak bureaucracy with only a limited capacity to manage its programs. Id. In the
past very large-scale projects, such as multi-million dollar commercial urban renewal
projects, have not been amenable to control by HUD. See, e.g., C. HARTMAN, YERBA
BUENA (1974). Smaller scale, more specialized projects and demonstrations, or fund-
ing to jurisdictions with comparatively less sophistication and independent political
muscle have been amenable to some control.
93. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, § 103(c), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5303(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
94. Id. § 5318.
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CDBG assistance to better articulate their views. Citizen participa-
tion can be a helpful device to maintain accountability over post-
categorical systems.
At present, citizen participation in the CDBG program is required
in all phases of the planning and implementation of local community
development programs95 once funds have been allocated to a city.
There is no provision for citizen participation to affect the amount of
assistance coming to a city. The extraordinarily complex question of
appropriate national distribution of CDBG resources is not the kind
of question amenable to local citizen group decisionmaking, and
clearly such citizen participation should not replace the cybernetic
core of the allocation system. But regulations can be structured to
make citizen participation a more important influence in raising or
lowering CDBG funding as allocated by formula. Assuming appro-
priate standards controlling program benefits, those cities having a
high level of citizen satisfaction with the outcomes of CDBG pro-
grams should receive increments in funding over what the formula(s)
would provide. Those cities where citizen satisfaction is low may ap-
propriately have funds cut back. Solicitation of citizen views in con-
nection with application and grantee performance reporting can be
structured in such a way as to make the cybernetic core of the pro-
gram more responsive to human values.
LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS
Increasing the responsiveness of the CDBG allocation system to
HUD norms and citizen views (within appropriate limits) would do
much to sensitize the cybernetic core of the CDBG allocation system
to needs, interests and opportunities beyond those encapsulated
within the formula. But each of these devices relies to some extent
upon articulated needs. In the CDBG system, however, many of the
intended beneficiaries of the program are not well organized, politi-
cally powerful or articulate persons. In such a situation, entitlements
and advocacy play important roles. 6
Despite a substantial amount of CDBG-related litigation, no
CDBG-related case has proceeded to a legal conclusion favorable to
plaintiffs. 7 This is significantly related to the absence of enforceable
95. See Community Development Block Grant Regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 570.303
(1977).
96. Hirshen & LeGates, Neglected Dimensions in the Design ofLow Income Hous-
ing Programs, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 3, 12, 27 (1975).
97. P. DOMMEL, R. NATHAN, S. LmBscHn'z, M. WRIGHTSON, DECENTRALIZING
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entitlements in the legislation and/or administrative regulations, a
situation shifting with recent publication of new administrative regu-
lations concerning the Act.9"
Congress should write more explicit entitlements into the CDBG
legislation, and HUD should further crystallize clear entitlements in
administrative regulations. This would provide impetus to "bottom
up" control of the CDBG program from intended beneficiaries. A
responsive HUD grievance mechanism (something presently lacking
in the program) would be important to such a system.
CONCLUSION
Reliance upon computer formulas to distribute federal urban
assistance in the Community Development Block Grant program has
created a qualitatively new form of "cybernetic federalism." The
computer is a powerful tool for analyzing need and calculating bene-
fit payment amounts, and a cybernetic core to the CDBG distribution
process should be retained.
The first three years of the CDBG program held many lessons
about the CDBG distribution formulas. The original CDBG formula
was extremely inefficient in that it both distributed assistance to re-
cipients who had little or no need for it (vertical inefficiency) and did
not distribute aid in the amounts called for to recipient jurisdictions
with severe physical deprivation needs (horizontal inefficiency).
Adoption of a dual formula in 1977 significantly redressed the hori-
zontal inefficiency problem by expanding the pot of CDBG money
and distributing the increment largely in line with need-particularly
as measured by indicators of physical distress. The present dual
formula remains defective in that it does not eliminate vertical ineffi-
ciency created by the original formula, and thus funds continue to be
distributed to jurisdictions having little or no need for them. Be-
cause such "protected" jurisdictions are concentrated in certain re-
gions of the country, reforms to cut and/or cap assistance to these
"protected" jurisdictions runs the risk of splitting Congress and fail-
ing. Politically sensitive direct and/or lagged cutting or capping may
be possible. Alternatively, introduction of an impaction adjustment
to the formula, including measures of both social and physical dis-
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1978) (Appendix on CDBG litigation by D. Keating &
R. LeGates).
98. 43 Fed. Reg. 8450, 8450-74 (1978) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570).
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tress, which discriminates need for individual cities, will achieve
marked improvements in vertical efficiency.
There are, however, limits to what can be accomplished within the
framework of cybernetic federalism. Within the limits of HUD's ad-
ministrative capabilities, increased discretion should be introduced
into the CDBG assistance process to widen the range of factors con-
sidered in the distribution of assistance. Regulatory frameworks
should be established to permit increased discretionary decisionmak-
ing within achievable limits, increased responsiveness to legitimate
articulated desires of intended consumers of CDBG benefits, and to
legitimate advocates of inchoate interests intended to be served by
the legislation.
A mixed cybernetic/human system employing both computers and
human intuition should be developed beyond cybernetic federalism
to provide for sensitive targeting and control of CDBG assistance.
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